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COMMENTS
DANCING ON THE OUTER PERIMETERS: THE
SUPREME COURT'S PRECARIOUS PROTECTION OF
EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT
I. INTRODUCTION
In July of 1991, Lee Baxendall, executive director of the Trade
Association for Nude Recreation, submitted a formal request to the
Indiana Convention Center and Hoosier Dome inquiring as to
whether his organization could use the Indianapolis facility for a
gathering of some 50,000 nude revelers.' Baxendall made his request
after reading about a Supreme Court decision upholding the applica-
tion of an Indiana public indecency statute to nude dancing2 and
desired to test concurring Justice Scalia's notion3 that "[t]he purpose
of Indiana's nudity law would be violated, I think, if 60,000 fully
consenting adults crowded into the Hoosierdome [sic] to display their
genitals to one another, even if there were not an offended innocent
in the crowd." 4 After consulting with counsel, the facility's director
summarily denied Baxendall's request.' Instead, the Trade Associa-
tion for Nude Recreation would need to locate an alternate venue for
its festival, presumably in a state lacking an anti-nudity statute bear-
1. See What Scalia (Almost) Had Wrought, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 6 [hereinaf-
ter Scalia].
2. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (plurality opinion).
3. Scalia, supra note 1, at 6.
4. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia was responding to
the dissenters' notion that public indecency statutes should be narrowly drawn so as only to
protect nonconsenting adults and children from offense. Id. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting).
Admission-paying patrons of nude dancing establishments have clearly consented to public dis-
plays of nudity and therefore should not be the recipients of the state's police power protec-
tions. Id. Justice Scalia, however, rejected such a "Thoreauvian 'you-may-do-what-you-like-
so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-someone-else' beau ideal" as neither being written into the Con-
stitution nor being shared by a majority of the American public. Id. at 2465 (Scalia, J., con-
curring). Absent some specific constitutional protection to the contrary, states may prohibit
certain activities merely because they are considered immoral. Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)).
5. Scalia, supra note 1, at 6.
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ing the Supreme Court's imprimatur.
Baxendall probably was not the only person confused by the
decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.," which found that nude
dancing was "expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the
First Amendment," but nonetheless upheld Indiana's public inde-
cency statute as applied to dancers at the Glen Theatre and Kitty
Kat Lounge.' Dicta in earlier cases8 suggested that nude dancing
received some First Amendment protection,9 and the Court had also
definitively ruled on two occasions"0 that flag-burning was protected
expressive conduct." Expressive conduct is a hybrid activity combin-
ing elements of "expression" and "conduct" and is therefore poten-
tially subject to governmental regulations that would be invalid if
applied to "pure" expression. 2 Generally, an incidental restriction
6. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (plurality opinion).
7. Id. at 2460. The plurality further narrowed its qualified endorsement of nude danc-
ing's First Amendment protection by noting that it was only "marginally" on the outer perim-
eters of protected expressive conduct. Id.; see also infra note 182 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (reversing
convictions of adult bookstore operators under a local zoning ordinance that did not permit
nude dancing "peep shows," and agreeing with some state courts that "nude dancing is not
without its First Amendment protections from official regulation"); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,
422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975) (sustaining a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a
local ordinance prohibiting topless dancing, but only noting that "barroom type" nude dancing
"might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances");
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (upholding California's prohibition of sexually
explicit live entertainment and films in establishments licensed to sell alcoholic beverages by
the drink, but declining to hold that all sexually explicit performances lack First and Four-
teenth Amendment protection).
9. See Lisa Maimer, Comment, Nude Dancing and the First Amendment, 59 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1275 (1991). This comment was written prior to Barnes.
10. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (affirming trial court's conten-
tion that the Flag Protection Act of 1989 is unconstitutional); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (overturning defendant's conviction for flag desecration).
11. Throughout this comment, the term "expressive conduct" will be used to refer to
conduct specifically employed in order to communicate an idea or message. Thus, the burning
of an American flag is conduct intended to express certain political viewpoints, while nude
dancing is conduct intended to express certain erotic messages. The specific form of expressive
conduct is irrelevant for basic constitutional purposes as the First Amendment is implicated
simply when an actor has engaged in conduct with the intention of conveying an idea. There-
fore, regulations of such disparate activities as flag burning, sleeping in a public park in order
to emphasize the plight of the homeless, and nude dancing have supposedly received the same
basic constitutional analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 122-203. See generally, LAU-
RENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 825-32 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing ex-
pressive conduct).
12. The regulations at issue are often not facial restrictions on free expression as they
are targeted specifically at conduct such as Indiana's broad prohibition of public nudity.
Barnes, 11l S. Ct. at 2462 (plurality opinion). Thus, Indiana's prohibition of nude dancing
arose as an effect of its more generalized prohibition of public nudity and not because Indiana
had specifically sought to ban nude dancing. Id. at 2460. These regulations, therefore, can be
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on constitutionally protected expressive conduct can survive First
Amendment muster provided that (1) the questioned regulation fur-
thers substantial state interests unrelated to the suppression of free
speech, and (2) the regulation is no greater than essential to the fur-
therance of the substantial state interest.13
This comment examines the Supreme Court's developing body
of case law on the validity of governmental restrictions on constitu-
tionally protected "expressive conduct." It begins by tracing the de-
velopment of the conduct-as-speech problem through a discussion of
the leading expressive conduct cases.14 In so doing, the comment
posits that the Court has implicitly adopted a bifurcated approach to
the expressive conduct problem, whereby restrictions upon suppos-
edly "private" or "non-political" speech receive much less rigorous
levels of judicial review than restrictions upon "public" or "political"
speech. 5 Concluding that this two-track jurisprudence is both un-
predictable and insufficiently solicitous to those forms of expressive
conduct that the Court has decided to disfavor, the comment provides
an alternate, unified approach to the conduct-as-speech problem that
will avoid the Court's tendency to denigrate the significance of sup-
considered "incidental restriction[s]" on free expression. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968). See generally David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42
U. MIAMI L. REV. 491 (1988) (discussing the development and application of the "incidental
regulation test").
Incidental restrictions on expressive conduct present acute constitutional problems because
the First Amendment protects speech, while there is no other comparable protection for mere
conduct. Prohibitions on conduct generally can sustain constitutional attack merely by being
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Such restrictions are presumptively
constitutional, and the Court will pay great deference to the process of democratic legislative
decision-making. See Russell W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional
Law, 21 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 449, 451-52 (1988) (describing rationality review).
Conversely, restrictions on the fundamental right of constitutionally protected free speech
are presumptively unconstitutional and can be validated only by satisfying some form of
heightened judicial review. See Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 883, 891-93 (1991) [hereinafter Galloway, Basic Analysis]. The Supreme
Court has employed a number of different "tests" in analyzing free speech claims, but gener-
ally subjects "content" restrictions on free speech to strict scrutiny by requiring that the gov-
ernment demonstrate that its restriction on free expression is a "necessary" and "substantially
effective means" of furthering a "compelling [state] interest." Id. at 910-15 (emphasis added).
However, the Court has also employed a heightened, although not quite so exacting, level of
review to disfavored speech and "content-neutral" restrictions on free speech, such as Indiana's
public indecency law. Id. at 932-54. This mid-level scrutiny requires the government to
demonstrate that its restriction on free expression be "narrowly tailored to further a[n impor-
tant,] significant or substantial[, but not necessarily compelling,] government interest." Id. at
935, 942-43 (emphasis added).
13. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
14. See infra notes 32-203 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 204-17 and accompanying text.
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posedly "private" speech, and provide an increased and equivalent
level of constitutional protection to all forms of "expressive
conduct."16
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Speech / Conduct Distinction Generally
Although the First Amendment's broad provision that "Con-
gress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech"'" cre-
ates a presumption of absolute expressive autonomy, the Supreme
Court has identified various types of speech that are to be afforded
little, if any, constitutional protection."8 While a broad concept such
as obscenity might, in itself, be immune to precise constitutional defi-
nition, the definitional problem becomes particularly acute with the
entanglement of "speech" and "conduct," since conduct does not re-
ceive the same sweeping constitutional protection as does speech. 9
The Supreme Court considers non-verbal conduct to be suffi-
ciently "expressive" for First Amendment purposes if the actor in-
tended his conduct "to convey a particularized message" within a
context where "the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."'  Thus, such disparate activities
as labor picketing,2' civil rights protests,22 draft card burning,2" flag-
burning,24 overnight park sleeping intended to dramatize the plight
of the homeless, 25 and nude dancing 2  have each received at least
16. See infra notes 268-89 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. "Fighting words" and obscenity are considered to have no constitutional value and,
therefore, receive no First Amendment protection. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("fighting words").
The Court has also considered other types of speech, such as indecency and commercial speech,
to be of low value and, therefore, worthy of limited First Amendment protection. E.g., Young
v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (indecency); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech).
Governmental restrictions and prohibitions on unprotected speech are presumptively con-
stitutional and subject only to low-level, deferential rationality review. Conversely, restrictions
and prohibitions on protected speech are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to a more
intensive judicial review where the government has the burden of demonstrating the constitu-
tionality of its action. See Galloway, Basic Analysis, supra note 12, at 891-903, 910-12, 932;
see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
21. See infra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 81-102 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 122-59 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text.
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some constitutional protection as "expressive conduct." In fact, the
term "expressive conduct" can encompass an infinite number of ac-
tivities whereby individuals intentionally communicate ideas,
messages, and viewpoints through symbolic conduct.2 7  Political
protesters might burn American flags in order to symbolize their op-
position to governmental policies,"8 while dancers might wish to
dance in the nude in order to convey certain erotic messages.29
This combination of "expression" and "conduct" therefore pro-
vides courts with the difficult task of disentangling the constitution-
ally protected "expression" from the unprotected "conduct" when as-
sessing restrictions upon "expressive conduct." The Supreme Court
has struggled with expressive conduct by balancing the fundamental
right of free speech against the governmental police power interests
of furthering the general health, safety, and welfare.30 In that re-
spect, the Court's analysis of expressive conduct has borrowed heav-
ily from its Fourteenth Amendment analysis of regulations affecting
pure, non-expressive conduct."1
B. The Pre-United States v. O'Brien Approach
The Court first considered the question of expressive conduct in
Stromberg v. California,"2 which overturned a conviction based
upon a California statute prohibiting the public display of a red
flag." While the Court provided lip-service to fundamental First
26. See infra notes 173-203 and accompanying text.
27. Professor Louis Henkin argues that the Court's entire attempt to distinguish "con-
duct" and "speech" is intellectually specious as "[s]peech is conduct, and actions speak." Louis
Henkin, Forward: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 79 (1969). In Professor Hen-
kin's estimation, there is "nothing intrinsically sacred about wagging the tongue or wielding a
pen . . . and nothing [is] intrinsically more sacred about words than other symbols." Id. at 79.
For Henkin, the speech/conduct connection has ancient American lineage dating at least to the
Boston Tea Party and Stamp Act protests whose participants were well aware that "ideas are
communicated, disagreements [are] expressed [and] protests [are] made other than by word or
mouth or pen." Id. Meaningful constitutional distinctions, therefore, cannot be made between
"speech" and "conduct" in the abstract, but rather between "conduct" that communicates and
"other kinds of [non-communicative] conduct." Id. at 79-80. If an actor's conduct is "intended
as expression, if in fact it communicates, especially if it becomes a comprehensible form of
expression, it is 'speech.' " Id. at 80.
28. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
29. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, (1991).
30. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
31. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
32. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
33. The statute, Penal Code § 403(a), had criminalized the display of a "red flag, ban-
ner or badge . . . in any public place" intended to symbolize opposition to organized govern-
ment. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 361, 367.
1993]
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Amendment values by apparently protecting a highly unpopular
viewpoint, 34 it actually based its decision solely upon Fourteenth
Amendment grounds by finding the statute "vague and indefinite"
and therefore violating the defendant's due process rights."8 As one
commentator has noted, "the Court's use of the vagueness doctrine
provided an amorphous level of protection. After Stromberg, it would
be extremely difficult to predict with any certainty how another inci-
dental regulation case might be decided." 38
The Court's "amorphous level of protection" continued
throughout the pre-O'Brien era as it adopted a variety of approaches
in assessing "expressive conduct," each continuing to influence its
current analysis. The Court initially found inspiration in the "clear
and present danger" doctrine 7 as it distinguished between protected,
conduct-oriented expression and the unprotected advocacy of violence
or other illegal activity.38
The Court first applied the "clear and present danger" ration-
ale to expressive conduct cases in Thornhill v. Alabama, 9 and pro-
vided First Amendment protection to peaceful picketing as a means
of publicizing labor disputes.40 The State of Alabama had vigorously
asserted that its anti-picketing statute was a valid exercise of its po-
lice power concern in preventing industrial strife, potential interfer-
ences with private property, and generalized breaches of the peace
that presumably resulted from picketing.4' The Court rejected the
State's broad claim by noting that:
Every expression of opinion on matters that are important has
the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of one rather
than another group in society. But the group in power at any
moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truth-
34. The defendant was a Young Communist League camp counselor charged with the
daily ceremonial raising of a red flag. Id. at 362.
35. Id. at 369.
36. See Day, supra note 12, at 502.
37. The doctrine was initially articulated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919), where the Court sustained the defendant's conviction for conspiring to obstruct the
military draft in violation of the Espionage Act of 1917. Id. at 53. The defendant had mailed
materials to draftees arguing that conscription was unconstitutional and urging them to assert
their constitutional rights. Id. at 51. Justice Holmes, writing for the unanimous court, noted
that, "Ithe question in every case is whether the words used are used in circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substan-
tive evils that Congress had a right to prevent." Id. at 52.
38. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
39. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
40. Id. at 95.
41. Id. at 105.
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ful discussion of matters of public interest merely on the show-
ing that others may thereby be persuaded to take action incon-
sistent with its interests.42
Alabama failed to demonstrate that picketing created a "clear danger
of substantive evils" as the Court could not find that the picketing
posed a serious and imminent threat to normal industrial opera-
tions."3 Thus, while the Alabama statute was clearly aimed at the
conduct -of picketing, its sweeping reach impermissibly suppressed
the interests of union members in publicizing the existence of a labor
dispute and therefore could not withstand constitutional scrutiny."
While Thornhill represented the first explicit Supreme Court
acknowledgment that peaceful labor picketing was constitutionally
protected expressive activity,'8 the Court nonetheless premised its
holding on the notion that "freedom of speech ...embraces at the
least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of pub-
lic concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punish-
ment.""' The Court believed that public discussion of industrial con-
ditions and labor disputes was indispensable to the process of
popular democracy and did not need to consider whether "matters of
private concern" would receive any kind of constitutional solici-
tude. " However, as will be discussed below,' 8 the Thornhill Court's
notion of the special significance of "matters of public concern"
would greatly affect the future level of constitutional protection af-
forded to different forms of "expressive conduct."
The most sweeping pronouncements of Thornhill waned in
subsequent years as the Court consistently upheld state court injunc-
tions enjoining peaceful labor picketing for state-defined illegal pur-
poses. 9 These cases culminated in International Brotherhood of
42. Id. at 104.
43. Id. at 105.
44. See id. at 105-06.
45. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1990).
46. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 101-02 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 103. The Court no longer considers public discussion of industrial conditions
and labor disputes to be relevant to the democratic process as it has recently reduced labor
picketing to mere economic activity. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 49-203 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Graham, 345 U.S.
192, 193, 200-01 (1953) (sustaining injunction against picketing that violated a state "Right to
Work" law by indicating that a building contractor was employing nonunion labor); Building
Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 533, 540-41 (1950) (sus-
taining injunction against picketers reacting to the failure to unionize a small hotel on the
ground that the picketing would represent illegal employer coercion of employees' choice of
19931
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Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt,5" where the Court sustained an in-
junction prohibiting picketing directed at the establishment of a
"union shop."" A Wisconsin statute had prohibited employees from
inducing any employer to interfere with the rights of other employ-
ees, 52 and the Court held that the issuing of an injunction was there-
fore a rational means to effectuate the state's fair labor practices
policy.53
In Vogt, the Court examined its post-Thornhill cases5" and con-
cluded that they stood for the proposition that even "peaceful" pick-
eting involved more than the mere "communication of ideas. '
Rather, organized picketing necessarily involved "patrol of a particu-
lar locality . . . and the very presence of a picket line may induce
action of one kind or another quite irrespective of the ideas that are
being disseminated."56 By distinguishing protected communication
from unprotected purposeful conduct, the Court undermined its ear-
lier sweeping sanction of action-inducing expression which did not
pose a "clear danger of substantive evils." 5 No longer would the
"clear and present danger" doctrine necessarily provide a heightened
level of scrutiny as applied to "expressive conduct." Instead, the
Court found that an injunction enjoining union shop activists ration-
ally advanced Wisconsin's fair labor policies. 8
bargaining representatives); International Bhd. of Teamsters Union, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339
U.S. 470, 471, 480-81 (1950) (sustaining injunction against picketing of a business to secure
compliance with a union shop demand); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 461, 469
(1950) (sustaining injunction prohibiting picketing of a business solely to secure compliance
with a racial quota demand); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 491-92,
504 (1949) (sustaining state prohibition on picketing designed io enforce an illegal secondary
boycott violating the state's antitrust laws); Carpenters Union of Americas, Local No. 213 v.
Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 723-24, 728 (1942) (sustaining enforcement of a state antitrust
law against picketers attempting to influence a nonunion labor contractor by supplying pres-
sure upon a neutral restaurant-owning client); Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local
753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 292, 296 (1941) (sustaining a general injunction
against picketing where previous violence could create a justifiable fear of future violence). But
see Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 771-72, 775 (1942) (overturning, in a
narrowly restricted manner, an injunction prohibiting a union from picketing bakeries serviced
by independent peddlers refusing to conform to union requests).
50. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
51. Id. at 285.
52. Picketing that induced an employer-declared "union shop" would presumably inter-
fere with the rights of employees seeking to abstain from union membership. Id. at 286.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
55. Vogt, 354 U.S. at 289.
56. Id. (quoting Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (concur-
ring opinion)).
57. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
58. Vogt, 354 U.S. at 295.
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The Court's distinction between plain speech and expressive
conduct provided two important, if seemingly inconsistent, decisions
arising from the civil rights movement. In Edwards v. South Caro-
lina,59 187 peaceful demonstrators had been arrested and convicted
for a common law breach of the peace after assembling at the South
Carolina state house, singing songs, and delivering a "religious ha-
rangue" in protest against official segregation.60 The Court reversed
their convictions, concluding that the civil rights demonstration rep-
resented the exercise of First Amendment rights "in their most pris-
tine and classic form."" While not specifically referring to the ra-
tional basis test, the Court, echoing Stromberg, nonetheless found the
common law offense to be insufficiently precise to sustain the convic-
tions, and indicated that "this would be a different case" if the dem-
onstrators were convicted under something akin to a traffic regula-
tion statute. 62 The Court ignored its post-Thornhill concern that
picketing might create concerted action extending beyond the pur-
poses of its expressed ideas and applied the "clear and present dan-
ger" doctrine by noting that free speech:
[M]ay indeed serve its high purpose when it induces a condi-
59. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
60. Id. at 233. The Court never defined "religious harangue." The Columbia, South
Carolina, city manager used the term in describing a speech given by one of the protest lead-
ers. Id.
61. Id. at 235. The exercise of First Amendment rights "in their most pristine and
classic form" can be seen as equating with the Court's conception of speech on "matters of
public concern" in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940); see also Estlund, supra
note 45, at 18.
The Court actually has a very long history of providing strong First Amendment protec-
tion to politically oriented speech beyond the expressive conduct realm. For example, although
the Court never directly assessed the constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798, it later
declared that a "broad consensus" had emerged among "Justices of this Court" that the Act
violated the First Amendment specifically because it imposed restraints upon the criticism of
government and public officials. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). In
fact, Congress itself subsequently thought that its own Act was unconstitutional and repaid
fines levied under its mandate, while President Jefferson pardoned those individuals convicted
and sentenced under the Act. Id. In an influential concurring opinion, Justice Brandeis
thought that the Constitution's framers adopted the First Amendment because:
They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discussion and spread of political truth; that without
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against dissemination of noxious doctrine;
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 367, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by
Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
62. Edwards, 372 U.S. at 236.
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tion of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging .. . .That is why freedom of speech . . . is protected
against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to pro-
duce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest.6"
Thus, while labor picketing involved elements of conduct and speech
that could create substantive evil, a civil rights demonstration was
"pure" speech intended to bring social and political change, and was
therefore worthy of the highest constitutional protection.8 '
The Court abandoned this temporary resurrection of Thornhill
in Cox v. Louisiana,6 5 which actually reversed the defendant's con-
viction for leading a courthouse demonstration protesting official seg-
regation and the previous arrests of twenty-three student activists.66
Unlike the very similar demonstrators in Edwards, the Court as-
serted that the defendant's group was not engaging in "such a pure
form of expression as [a] newspaper comment or a telegram by a
citizen to a public official."'0 7 Instead, the demonstration was "ex-
pression mixed with particular conduct."6 While Louisiana could
not constitutionally suppress the content and other expressive ele-
ments of the demonstration, its narrowly drawn statute prohibiting
the conduct of courthouse picketing rationally served the important
state interest in protecting the judicial process.69 The "clear and pre-
sent danger" doctrine was held to be inapplicable to situations in
which a state legislature validly concluded that specific conduct posed
a threat to something as important as its judicial system.7 ' Thus,
Louisiana's anti-picketing statute was the functional equivalent of
the traffic regulation statute that might have made Edwards "a dif-
ferent case."'71 It was, therefore, a proper recipient of minimal judi-
cial scrutiny. 2
Despite being three to five decades old, Thornhill, Vogt, Ed-
63. Id. at 237 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (emphasis
added)).
64. Id. at 238.
65. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
66. The conviction was reversed because a police officer had intentionally misled the
defendant into believing that his group was not picketing near a courthouse. This constituted
entrapment and violated the defendant's due process rights. Id. at 569-71.
67. Id. at 564.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 566.
71. See supra text accompanying note 62.
72. Cox, 379 U.S. at 566.
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wards, and Cox remain important as they represent the Court's
early propensity in providing expressive conduct with a level of con-
stitutional protection according to the supposed value of the underly-
ing speech accompanying the outward conduct." While United
States v. O'Brien74 would refine the Court's expressive conduct ap-
proach, the flag-burning cases," Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence"6 and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., each discussed
below, are indebted to the Court's pre-O'Brien distinction between
politically important "public" speech and less politically important
"private" speech. 78  Despite the apparent uniformity of O'Brien's
73. The Court subsequently sharpened its distinction between the public worthiness of
labor disputes and political protests. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
(1982), the Court invalidated a trial court's award of damages and economic losses to white-
owned businesses that were targeted for a consumer boycott by civil rights organizations. Id. at
934. The Court distinguished its highly deferential post-Thornhill approach to labor picketing
cases by noting that the NAACP's boycott was peaceful expressive activity on public issues and
was oriented toward achieving direct political and economic reform. Id. at 913. The Court
explained its new disparate treatment of labor and political activity by noting that a recent
case, Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980), had termed the issues involved in labor
picketing as merely "economic," while civil rights boycotts necessarily involved "public af-
fairs." Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 913. Claiborne Hardware Co., therefore, repre-
sents the Court's final diminution of the broad sweep of Thornhill, in that labor picketing,
once thought to be indispensable to the process of popular democracy, was no longer consid-
ered to involve real "matters of public concern." See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text;
see also, Estlund, supra note 45, at 18-19, 22-23.
74. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
75. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
76. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
77. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
78. The Court has very explicitly applied the "public concern" doctrine in other First
Amendment contexts. In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the Court sustained the
dismissal of a New Orleans assistant district attorney who had been fired after circulating a
staff questionnaire concerning office employment policies. Id. at 141. While noting that public
employment cannot be conditioned upon a waiver of an individual's First Amendment rights,
the Court nonetheless declined to find a colorable constitutional claim as the staff questionnaire
did not involve a "matter of public concern." Id. at 142, 154. Instead, the questionnaire was
merely an extension of the assistant district attorney's private dispute with her superiors over
an unwelcomed transfer, and there was no constitutional right to "gather ammunition for an-
other round of controversy." Id. at 148.
Similarly, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985),
the Court held that the First Amendment does not extend to libel suits initiated by "private"
figures unless the allegedly defamatory speech involved a "matter of public concern." Id. at
761-62 (plurality opinion). While credit information regarding a private business's public dec-
laration of bankruptcy is not completely irrelevant, the Court nonetheless concluded that such
information largely concerned private economic matters that were divorced from the broad
public interest and not of the type of speech that implicated the First Amendment. Id. at 761-
63. This constitutional de-valuing of mere "economic" information is consistent with the
Court's conclusion in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), that a politi-
cally inspired consumer boycott received more constitutional protection than an economically
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four-pronged test, 9 the following discussion will demonstrate that
the Court has applied O'Brien by following Thornhill in imposing a
significantly higher burden upon governmental entities seeking to
justify the restriction of discernibly political expressive conduct.80
C. The Modern Approach: United States v. O'Brien
In March of 1966, David Paul O'Brien and three companions
burned their draft cards at the South Boston Courthouse in symbolic
opposition to the Vietnam War.8 1 O'Brien was subsequently con-
victed under a Selective Service Act provision prohibiting the willful
and knowing destruction or mutilation of draft cards.8"
The Court immediately rejected the defendant's facial challenge
to the provision's constitutionality,8" but still assumed that the "al-
leged communicative element" in his activity necessarily implicated
inspired labor picketing. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
For a more detailed discussion of the "public concern" doctrine relative to Connick and
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., see Estlund, supra note 45, at 4-13.
79. See infra text accompanying note 89.
80. Still, the Court has noted that speech "not touching upon a matter of public con-
cern" is not automatically devoid of constitutional protection as "[the First Amendment does
not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political." Con-
nick, 461 U.S. at 147 (quoting Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967)).
Such "speech on private matters," therefore, does not "fall[] into one of the narrow and well-
defined classes of expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that the
State can prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction." Id. at 147.
Thus, the Court would appear to be indicating that private, non-political speech could receive
at least limited First Amendment protection. This revelation would render private speech
roughly analogous to commercial speech and indecency, two very well established categories of
low-value speech that the Supreme Court has provided with limited First Amendment protec-
tion. E.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (commercial speech); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976)
(indecency).
However, this notion is inconsistent with the Court's ultimate holdings in Connick and
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., where "matters of private concern" (a staff questionnaire and a
credit report, respectively) were found to be non-political and completely devoid of First
Amendment protection. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Despite this confusion, it is
at least clear that the Court will approach private speech with a degree of skepticism, the
precise extent of which is unknown, and will likely consider it to be non-political and constitu-
tionally suspect.
For a more detailed analysis of the Connick and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. Courts' implicit
branding of private speech as non-political, see Estlund, supra note 45 at 35-39.
81. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1968).
82. Id. at 370.
83. The Court forthrightly concluded that "[a] law prohibiting destruction of Selective
Service certificates no more abridges free speech on its face than a motor vehicle law prohibit-
ing the destruction of drivers' licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the destruction of books and
records." Id. at 375.
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the First Amendment."4 The inquiry continued, however, since
O'Brien expressed his anti-war sentiments through unprotected pur-
poseful conduct (draft card burning) that was potentially subject to
regulations advancing substantial state interests."5 While such a for-
mulation echoed the lower-level scrutiny of the rational basis test
employed, in varying degrees, in the labor picketing cases"' and in
Cox,8 7 the Court then promulgated a four-pronged test providing ex-
pressive conduct with more than mere rational basis protection, but
with significantly less protection than the sweeping shield of the
"clear and present danger" test.88 An incidental conduct regulation
of otherwise protected free expression will now survive First Amend-
ment challenge:
(1) if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
(2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental inter-
est; (3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essen-
tial to the furtherance of that interest."
After applying the above four-pronged test, O'Brien's conviction
was upheld because the Court found that the draft cards were issued
pursuant to Congress' broad constitutional power to raise and sup-
port armies.9" The cards served the substantial governmental interest
of initial draftee notification.91 The cards provided registrants with
proof of registration.92 The cards facilitated communication between
registrants and local induction boards.93 The cards reminded regis-
trants of their duty to notify the induction boards of address and
status changes.94 The general, non-discriminating provision, there-
84. Id. at 376.
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
88. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
89. Id. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, strongly asserted that attempting
to discern the substantial governmental interest in protecting the physical integrity of the draft
cards did not amount to an assessment of congressional motives. Id. at 383. Constitutional
jurisprudence does not allow the Court to embark upon the "hazardous" journey of invalidat-
ing an "otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an illicit motive" and members of
Congress may have various motives in articulating their support for a particular bill. Id. at
383-84.
90. Id. at 377.
91. Id. at 378.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 379.
94. Id.
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fore, was narrowly drawn and solely intended to provide an efficient
means of raising an army. 95 It, therefore, did not relate to a govern-
mental interest in the suppression of free expression.96
Finally, the statutory scheme did not unduly burden free ex-
pression as its anti-mutilation provision concerned "only the inde-
pendent noncommunicative . . . conduct within its reach,"97 i.e. the
efficient administration of the Selective Service System.9" Thus,
O'Brien was not convicted for expressing his opposition to the Viet-
nam War.99 Such a conviction would be automatically reversed as
the First Amendment prevents Congress from punishing those indi-
viduals who disagree with its policies.' 00 Rather, O'Brien was found
to have clearly violated a conduct-prohibiting congressional statute
and could not validly claim First Amendment protection merely be-
cause his conduct was intended as a vehicle to express an idea.' '
While O'Brien himself could not escape conviction for burning
his draft card, the test promulgated in the case bearing his name
seemed effectively to dispose of the least speech-protective aspects of
the rational basis test relative to "expressive conduct." No longer
could a governmental entity withstand an expressive conduct chal-
lenge merely by demonstrating that it had incidentally limited free
expression in its rational pursuit of a valid state interest. Instead, the
Court required that a governmental entity demonstrate (1) that the
substantial state interest be "unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression," and (2) that the incidental restriction on free speech be
"no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."'0 2
95. Id. at 381-82.
96. Id. at 381-82. But cf. Dean Alfange, Jr., Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The
Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1, which argues that the legislative history
provides convincing evidence that the amendment was specifically intended to prohibit the
burning of draft cards in protest against the Vietnam War. Id. at 5-6.
Chief Justice Warren apparently anticipated such a response by noting that while the
Senate and House Armed Services Committee's reports clearly indicated a concern with "defi-
ant" draft card destruction and the "open" encouragement of others to follow suit, the reports
"also indicate that this concern stemmed from an apprehension that unrestrained destruction of
cards would disrupt the smooth functioning of the Selective Service System." O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 385-86.
97. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
98. Id.
99. O'Brien argued that the anti-mutilation provision actually reflected congressional
motivation to suppress anti-war activism. The Court rejected his contention by noting that the
Court had historically refused to invalidate a statute on the basis of an allegedly illicit legisla-
tive motive. Id. at 382-83.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 376.
102. Id. at 377.
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D. Post-O'Brien Bifurcation: Expressive Conduct on Matters of
Public Concern and Matters of Private Concern
1. Public and Political Concerns: Rigorous Judicial Review
a. Continuing Symbolic Opposition to the Vietnam War
O'Brien's recognition that expressive conduct deserved height-
ened judicial sensitivity had an immediate salutary impact upon the
First Amendment. During the succeeding years, the Court held, on a
number of occasions, that various forms of symbolic opposition to the
Vietnam War could not be constitutionally suppressed under the
guise of governmental regulation of conduct. While not specifically
employing an O'Brien analysis,1"' the following cases recognized
that "symbolic speech" could have politically important ramifications
and could not be suppressed under the low-level rational basis test.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict,10 4 the Court reversed the suspensions of high school and junior
high school students who had worn black armbands in symbolic op-
position to the war. While such symbolic actions seemed quite simi-
lar to O'Brien's, 10 5 the Court nonetheless concluded that these "pas-
sive expression[s] of opinion" were closely related to "pure speech"
and were therefore entitled to comprehensive First Amendment pro-
tection.10 6 In fact, passivity might have been dispositive to the
Court's analysis as it could not find that the forbidden conduct would
CCmaterially and substantially interfere with the requirements of ap-
propriate discipline in the operation of the school."'1 0 7 Instead, the
Court determined that the suspensions appeared to have been "based
upon an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result
from the expression, even by the silent symbol of armbands, of oppo-
sition to this Nation's part in the conflagration in Vietnam."1 '' Such
103. The Court's failure even to cite, let alone apply, the recently promulgated O'Brien
standard in the Vietnam war "symbolic speech" cases might have resulted from an automatic
consideration that the government action at issue in these cases was specifically aimed either at
silencing dissenting viewpoints or generally limiting the quantity of political expression. See
Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV
615, 648-49 n.143 (1991). In the flag-burning cases, decided nearly two decades later, the
Court abandoned this implicit presumption of illicit governmental purpose and seriously as-
sessed the legislative intent underlying the anti-desecration statutes as a threshold issue by
specifically applying O'Brien's "unrelatedness" prong. See infra notes 122-59 and accompany-
ing text.
104. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dis., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
105. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
106. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06.
107. Id. at 509.
108. Id. at 511.
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a particularized prohibition of political expression was constitution-
ally impermissible. 10 9
In Schacht v. United States,"0 the Court sanctioned the wear-
ing of American military uniforms to symbolize opposition to the
war, despite a congressional statute prohibiting the calculated, unau-
thorized wearing of such uniforms in order to "discredit" the armed
forces."' The statute specifically punished opposition to American
foreign policy and necessarily related to an interest in the suppres-
sion of free expression." 2 Similarly, in Cohen v. California,"' the
Court reversed the offensive conduct conviction of the defendant who
symbolized his opposition to the war by appearing near a courthouse
wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft."" 4 The Court
noted that the defendant was motivated solely by his desire to ex-
press "the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the
draft," and that the application of the broad California penal statute
effectively served to punish a dissenting political viewpoint." 5
Finally, in Spence v. Washington," 6 the Court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction under a flag desecration statute for displaying an
American flag affixed with a large peace symbol out of his apart-
ment window." 7 The defendant had engaged in a "pointed expres-
sion of anguish ...about the then-current domestic and foreign af-
fairs of his government," and displayed his flag "in a way closely
analogous to the manner in which flags have always been used to
convey ideas.""' The State of Washington could not articulate any
governmental interest in prosecuting the defendant, and was not en-
titled to have the benefit of an O'Brien analysis." 9
Like the flag-burning cases discussed below, 20 Tinker, Schacht,
Cohen, and Spence were each inspired by the Court's earlier disdain
for governmental restrictions of politically-inspired expressive con-
duct on "matters of public concern."'' The anti-Vietnam War sym-
bolic speech cases represent the Court's first post-O'Brien indication
109. Id.
110. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 358 (1970).
111. Id. at 360.
112. Id. at 362-63.
113. Cohen v California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
114. Id. at 16, 20, 22.
115. Id. at 16, 22, 24.
116. Spence v. Washington, 418. U.S. 405 (1974).
117. Id. at 405.
118. Id. at 410, 415.
119. Id. at 415.
120. See infra notes 122-59 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 39-54, 59-64 and accompanying text.
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that it would apply a rigorous level of judicial review to restrictions
on expressive conduct seeking to affect political change. Governmen-
tal entities, therefore, could not simply use their police powers to
thwart non-traditional political opposition through the application of
general conduct regulations to politically "symbolic speech."
b. The Flag-Burning Cases
i. Texas v. Johnson
During a demonstration coinciding with the 1984 Republican
National Convention, Gregory Lee Johnson publicly burned an
American flag in order to express his opposition to the Reagan Ad-
ministration's foreign policy. 122 No one was physically injured dur-
ing the "ceremony," but several witnesses reported being seriously
offended by the display.' 21 Johnson was convicted under a Texas
statute prohibiting the desecration of a venerated object, sentenced to
a year in prison, and fined $2,000 for his offense.' 2
In reversing the conviction, the Court first concluded that John-
son's conduct necessarily implicated the First Amendment because it
was "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication" and was
intended to convey a particular political message to those who viewed
it. "'2 5 However, as in O'Brien., the Court's inquiry continued as "the
government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive con-
duct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word.' 21 Under
an O'Brien rationale, the Texas statute could withstand constitu-
tional attack only if the substantial interests that it advanced, as ap-
plied to Johnson's conduct, were completely "unconnected to
expression.' 2
7
In echoing the pre-O'Brien picketing cases,' 2 8 Texas first
claimed that the anti-desecration statute served the state's substantial
interest in preventing generalized breaches of the peace.'2 9 However,
the State offered no evidence that Johnson's conduct resulted in an
actual breach of the peace, but instead argued that the offensive na-
ture of flag burning could either potentially incite a riot or result in
122. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 400.
125. Id. at 404, 406 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).
126. Id. at 406.
127. Id. at 407.
128. See supra notes 39-72 and accompanying text.
129. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
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a direct personal retaliation by an offended onlooker.' After reiter-
ating the proposition cited in Edwards,'3' and elsewhere,' that free
speech perhaps serves its highest purpose by inducing conditions of
unrest and dissatisfaction with contemporaneous political conditions,
the Court noted that government cannot automatically suppress the
expression of provocative ideas merely because they may incite
riot.'" . In addition, the Court strongly asserted that it failed to find
evidence demonstrating that any "reasonable onlooker would have
regarded Johnson's generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the
policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an
invitation to exchange fisticuffs."'' Texas, therefore, ran afoul of
O'Brien to the extent that its anti-desecration statute failed to ad-
vance a compelling interest in preventing breaches of the peace.' 3 5
Texas also urged that the anti-desecration statute served a sub-
stantial interest in preserving the American flag as a national symbol
of unity.' 36 Texas presumably was worried that Johnson's activity
would lead Texans to believe either that the flag did not represent
American nationhood or that its citizens did not enjoy national
unity."' The Court responded that "the government's interest in
preserving the flag's special symbolic value is directly related to ex-
pression in the context of activity such as affixing a peace symbol to
a flag" or even the burning of a flag.' 8' Thus, Texas' asserted flag
interests became substantial only when a specific treatment of the
flag sought to communicate some kind of social or political mes-
sage.' 39 Texas had not attempted merely to protect the physical in-
tegrity of the flag, as Johnson certainly would not have been con-
victed had he burned a flag in order to dispose of it properly and in
accordance with federal law." 0 Rather, he was convicted solely be-
cause Texas' anti-desecration interest sought to forbid the use of an
American flag to convey a supposedly negative social or political
130. Id. at 408-09.
131. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
132. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1965).
133. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408-09.
134. Id. at 409.
135. Id. at 410.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 411.
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message.141 This interest, therefore, necessarily related to the "sup-
pression of free expression," and even implicitly content-based regu-
lations (like the Texas anti-desecration statute) have traditionally
been subjected to the highest level of judicial scrutiny. 42 The anti-
desecration statute could not withstand such scrutiny as applied to
Johnson's burning of an American flag to express his disagreement
with the Reagan Administration's foreign policy." ' It was, therefore,
an unconstitutional infringement upon Gregory Lee Johnson's con-
stitutionally protected free expression.1"4
ii. United States v. Eichman
In response to the Johnson decision, Congress passed the Flag
Protection Act of 1989145 (hereinafter "the Act"), which prohibited
the knowing mutilation, burning, defacing, defiling, or destruction of
an American flag, except when such activity occurred during the
proper disposal of a "worn or soiled" flag.146 The defendants were
convicted under the Act for two separate activities.' 7  Some had
burned several American flags on the steps of the Capitol while pro-
testing American domestic and foreign policy, while the others had
burned an American flag while protesting the passage of the Act
itself. 48
The Solicitor General attempted to distinguish the Act from the
Texas anti-desecration statute by arguing that Congress' true pur-
pose was to "protect . . . the physical integrity of the flag under all
circumstances"149 in order to safeguard its identity "as the unique
141. Id.
142. Id. at 412.
143. Id. at 413-15. In applying its "most exacting scrutiny," the Court found that
Texas could not articulate a compelling state interest in "preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity." Id. at 413. The state's asserted interest in preventing the
communication of messages that might cast doubt upon "either the idea that nationhood and
national unity are the flag's referents or that national unity actually exists" flatly contradicted
the "bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment . . . that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disa-
greeable." Id. at 413-14. The Court had never previously recognized an exception to this
"bedrock principle," and it could find no precedent that even suggested that a state "may foster
its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it." Id. Thus, Texas had
no real interest, compelling or otherwise, in the protection of the American flag against those
who might use it as a means of political expression.
144. Id.
145. Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
146. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 314 (1990).
147. Id at 312-13.
148. Id. at 312.
149. Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
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and unalloyed symbol of the Nation.... A flag burner's motive was
presumably irrelevant since the Act did not explicitly distinguish be-
tween contemptuous and non-contemptuous flag burning.' Any
burning of an American flag not related to its proper disposal was
punishable under the Act.1 5 2
In declaring the Act unconstitutional and affirming the reversal
of the defendants' convictions, the Court applied its Johnson analysis
and found that the Act represented Congress' asserted interest in the
suppression of free expression. " As in Johnson, the government's
true desire in preserving the flag's physical integrity "as a symbol of
certain national ideals" became relevant only when an individual's
"treatment of the flag communicates a message to others that is in-
consistent with those ideals."1 "" While Congress clearly might artic-
ulate a legitimate interest in preserving the flag's identity as a sym-
bol of sovereignty, the Act only criminalized activities traditionally
associated with disrespectful treatment of the flag and designed to
cast scorn on the values with which the flag is associated.", Finally,
the explicit exception for conduct related to the flag's proper disposal
protected activity historically associated with patriotism, an idea im-
permissibly singled out for favorable governmental treatment.1 ,
Like the Texas statute, the Act was explicitly related to an interest
in the suppression of free expression, and such a content-based re-
striction could not withstand the most exacting level of judicial scru-
tiny demanded by the First Amendment. 157
In both Johnson and Eichman, the O'Brien test served as a




153. Id. at 315-16.
154. Id. at 316.
155. Id. at 317.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 318. As in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the Court's application
of strict scrutiny to the Flag Protection Act of 1990 would attempt to discern a compelling
governmental interest in prohibiting the desecration of the American flag. Here, the Court
could not find a compelling enough interest to justify a content-based infringement on the
protesters' First Amendment rights for the same reasons articulated in Johnson. See supra note
143 and accompanying text. The Court also declined to accept:
[Tihe Government's invitation to reassess this conclusion in light of Congress'
recent recognition of a purported 'national consensus' favoring a prohibition on
flag burning .. . .Even assuming such a consensus exists, any suggestion that
the Government's interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty as popu-
lar opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment.
Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318.
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apply in assessing the constitutionality of the anti-desecration stat-
utes as applied to flag-burning protesters. In both cases, the Court
found that the protesters had employed the burning of American
flags in order to express their opinions on political matters, and that
the anti-desecration statutes ran afoul of O'Brien by directly relating
to governmental interests in suppressing the political messages asso-
ciated with flag-burning.' The remainder of the O'Brien test be-
came inapplicable once the Court found governmental entities pursu-
ing interests related to the suppression of particular political
viewpoints.' 59
158. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 317-18; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410.
159. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 313-14;Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), the Court considered the
collision between the expressive conduct of cross-burning and the St. Paul Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance for Disorderly Conduct, which provided that:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
In declaring the St. Paul ordinance to be facially unconstitutional, Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas (Justices White,
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens concurred in the judgment), failed to employ an O'Brien
analysis as the Court was bound by the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion that the ordi-
nance applied only to "fighting words," i.e. "conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite
immediate violence." Id. (quoting In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d. 507, 510 (Minn.
1990)). Justice Scalia, therefore, treated R.A.V. as a "fighting words" case, as opposed to an
expressive conduct case, and declared that the "speech" component of cross-burning (the ideas
that it expresses) receives First Amendment protection, while its pure "conduct" component
(the physical act of burning a cross) is unprotected and proscribable. Id. at 2543-45. The St.
Paul ordinance ran afoul of the First Amendment because it impermissibly applied:
[oInly to "fighting words" that insult, or provoke violence "on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender." Displays containing abusive invective, no mat-
ter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the
specified disfavored topics .... The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul
to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfa-
vored subjects.
Id. at 2547. The ordinance, therefore, involved clear content-based discrimination that could be
justified only by satisfying the Court's strict scrutiny, i.e. being a necessary means of furthering
a compelling state interest. Id. at 2548-49. While Justice Scalia thought that ensuring "the
basic human rights of members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimina-
tion" was certainly a compelling state interest, the St. Paul ordinance served merely to display
the city's hostility towards its enumerated disfavored biases. Id. at 2549-50. The First Amend-
ment forbids such practices, particularly since St. Paul could have drafted an ordinance that
could have served its compelling interests without "imposing unique limitations upon speakers
who (however benightedly) disagree." Id. at 2550 (emphasis added).
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2. Private and Non-Political Concerns: Highly Deferential
Review
a. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence
In 1982, the Community for Creative Non-Violence (hereinaf-
ter CCNV) obtained a National Park Service permit to conduct a
demonstration in Washington, D.C. designed to emphasize the plight
of the homeless."' The permit authorized CCNV's construction of
two symbolic "tent cities" in Lafayette Park and the Mall,' 61 but the
Service denied the organization's request to allow its demonstrators
permission to sleep in the tents.' 2 Park Service regulations permit-
ted "sleeping activities," such as "camping," only in certain specified
"campgrounds," and neither location had the requisite "camp-
ground" status. 6
The Court immediately assumed, but did not necessarily decide,
that "overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstration [was]
expressive conduct protected to some extent by the First Amend-
ment."' 64 Before reaching a full-blown O'Brien analysis, however,
the Court concluded that the camping restriction as applied to the
CCNV permit was a valid "time, place, or manner" restriction. '" .
Reasonable "time, place, or manner" restrictions upon free speech
are constitutionally valid (1) if they affect speech without regard to
its particular content, (2) if the promulgated regulations are nar-
rowly tailored to advance substantial state interests, and (3) if they
leave open ample alternative channels for free expression.' 66
160. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1984).
161. Id. The permit authorized the erection of twenty tents in Lafayette Park that
would accommodate fifty people and forty tents in the Mall that could accommodate one hun-
dred people. Id. at 292.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 290-92.
164. Id. at 293 (emphasis added). The Court later belittled CCNV's proposed demon-
stration by referring to it as "expressive sleeping, if that is what is involved in this case." Id. at
298 n.8.
165. Id. at 293.
166. Id. Subsequently, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), the
Court sketched the contours of the second and third prongs of the "time, place, or manner"
standard. While an incidental regulation on protected expression must be "narrowly tailored"
to serve a legitimate governmental interest, such a regulation need not constitute the "least
restrictive or least-intrusive means of doing so." Id. at 798. Instead, the "narrow tailoring"
requirement is satisfied "so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Id. at 799 (quoting
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). Regulations on protected expression,
therefore, will not be invalidated simply because the governmental interest may be adequately
served in a "less-speech-restrictive" manner or that there may be significantly narrower means
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By ignoring the fact that an anti-homelessness demonstration
might be most powerfully achieved through overnight park sleeping
(as homeless people often sleep in parks), the Court noted that the
sleeping ban was only a mere "limitation" upon the manner in
which the demonstration could be conducted.16 CCNV was still per-
fectly free to conduct its demonstration according to the non-sleeping
terms of the permit. 168 The ban was also found to be content-neutral
in that it still permitted CCNV to communicate through the erection
of the tent cities and the use of symbolic signs.'6 9 Finally, the ban
served the substantial interest of maintaining the parks "in the heart
of our Capital in an attractive and intact condition" by limiting the
"nature, extent, and duration of the demonstration and to that extent
[by] eas[ing] the pressure on the parks."'70 Overall, then, the Court
believed the anti-camping provision to be substantially related to the
"ends that it was designed to serve."""
Finally, the Court asserted that the O'Brien test and the "time,
place, or manner" standard involved essentially the same analysis
relative to the incidental regulation of speech.172 Thus, if the Park
Service's "time, place, or manner" ban on camping in Lafayette
Park and the Mall survived a First Amendment attack because it
narrowly served a substantial state interest, then it would be "unten-
able to invalidate it under O'Brien on the grounds that the govern-
mental interest is insufficient to warrant the intrusion of First
Amendment concerns or that there is an inadequate nexus between
the regulation and the interest sought to be served."' 73
b. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
Following a five-year challenge, a plurality of the Supreme
Court upheld the application of Indiana's public indecency statute7 4
to achieve the legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at 800. Finally, the "ample alternative
channels" requirement does not mean that the government must leave open the best or most
efficacious communicative vehicle. Id. at 802. Rather, a regulation will be invalidated only if
"the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate." Id. (emphasis added).
167. Clark, 468 U.S. at 298.
168. Id. at 294-95.
169. Id. at 295.
170. Id. at 296.
171. Id. at 297.
172. Id. at 298.
173. Id. at 298 n.8.
174. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (West 1986) provides under "public indecency":
Sec. 1. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct;
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to nude dancers at the Kitty Kat Lounge (hereinafter Kitty Kat) and
the Glen Theatre in South Bend, Indiana. 17' Kitty Kat presented go-
go dancing and complied with the public indecency statute by re-
quiring its dancers to wear "pasties" and a "G-string."' 6 The danc-
ers worked strictly for tips, and one of them initiated the challenge to
the statute's application because she believed that she would make
more money by dancing completely nude.1 77 Glen Theatre was an
adult bookstore that also offered a coin-operated mechanism allowing
its customers to view nude and semi-nude dancers through glass
panels. 178
Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy,1 79 initially concluded that the Court's pre-
vious cases 80 supported the contention that non-obscene nude danc-
ing is "expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment, though ... only marginally so." ' Indiana had broadly
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public inde-
cency, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals,
pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of
the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the
nipple, or the showing of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
Id.
175. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (plurality opinion). Kitty Kat
and Glen Theatre originally obtained injunctive relief in federal district court against the stat-
ute's enforcement. Id. at 2459. However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh District re-
versed, believing that previous case law precluded the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the statute.
Id. On remand, the district court rejected a challenge to the statute as applied to Kitty Kat and
Glen Theatre since it believed that nude dancing was not the type of expressive conduct wor-
thy of constitutional protection. Id. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed,
believing that nude dancing was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Id. at
2460. The case was then re-heard en banc, and the majority believed that non-obscene nude
dancing was entitled to First Amendment protection and that the public indecency statute was
impermissibly directed toward preventing the expression of erotic messages and sexuality. Id.
at 2460.
176. Id. at 2458.
177. Id. at 2459.
178. Id.
179. Justices Scalia and Souter prepared separate concurring opinions. See infra notes
182 and 188.
180. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (reversing convictions
of adult bookstore operators under a local ordinance that did not permit nude dancing "peep
shows," and agreeing with some state courts that "nude dancing is not without its First
Amendment protection from official regulation"); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19
(1972) (upholding California's prohibition of sexually explicit live entertainment and films in
establishments licensed to sell alcoholic beverages by the drink, but declining to hold that all
sexually explicit performances lack First Amendment protection).
181. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460 (plurality opinion).
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proscribed "public nudity," and the limitations placed upon the pro-
tected expression of nude dancing flowed incidentally from its much.
more general prohibition.182 The statute's application, therefore, was
a proper recipient of an O'Brien analysis, as it had unexpectedly
affected constitutionally protected expression.'
Despite the lack of recorded Indiana legislative history and the
Indiana Supreme Court's supposed failure to highlight the purpose
of the public indecency statute, 84 the plurality hypothesized that the
statute was specifically directed at protecting the social order and
public morality through its general prohibition of public nudity.185
Presumably, the Indiana legislature concluded that its citizens mor-
ally disapproved of "people appearing in the nude among strangers
in public places," and had properly utilized its general police powers
to further the public health, safety, and morals.' 6 The Court had
long deemed the protection of public morality to be a valid state in-
terest and had recently announced that "[tihe law ... is constantly
based on notions of morality . . . . [I]f all laws representing essen-
tially moral choices are to be [constitutionally] invalidated ..., the
courts will be very busy indeed."' 87 It is, therefore, axiomatic that
182. Id. Justice Scalia disagreed with the entire notion of an "incidental" restriction on
constitutionally protected free expression. Id. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring). In his view,
Indiana's public indecency statute was merely a "general law regulating conduct." Id. It was
directed at non-expressive public nudity generally, not nude dancing specifically, and an "in-
tent to convey a 'message of eroticism' (or any other message)" was, simply, not a necessary
element of a public indecency offense. Id. at 2464. Indiana's application of its public indecency
statute to nude dancing, therefore, did not implicate the Constitution and was not subject to
any First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 2463, 2465.
183. Id. at 2460-61 (plurality opinion). Indiana argued that its public indecency statute
constituted a reasonable "time, place, or manner" regulation. While indicating that a "time,
place, or manner" analysis generally evaluated restrictions on expression occurring on public
property, the plurality noted that Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984), stood for the proposition that the analysis was essentially the same as the O'Brien
test. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460 (plurality opinion).
184. While the Indiana Supreme Court might have never completely delineated the pre-
cise contours of the public indecency law, Indiana's Attorney General argued that State v.
Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. 1979), stood for the proposition that the indecency statute
does not prohibit public nudity as part of "some larger form of expression meriting protection
when the communication of ideas is involved." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2473 (White, J., dissent-
ing). Thus, the moral evil sought to be avoided by the statute (public nudity among strangers)
would not obtain in cases of theatrical productions. Id.
185. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461 (plurality opinion). The plurality noted that such stat-
utes had ancient common law lineage and still existed in forty-seven states. Id. Public inde-
cency statutes in Indiana had a similarly long history as an 1831 statute prohibited "open and
notorious lewdness, or ...any grossly scandalous and public indecency." Id. (quoting Rev.
Laws of Ind., ch. 26, § 60 (1831) (repealed)).
186. Id. at 2461-62.
187.' Id. at 2462 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)).
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the states could constitutionally utilize their police powers to protect
public morality.' 88
The plurality then applied O'Brien's "unrelatedness" prong
and concluded that Indiana's expressed statutory interest in prohibit-
ing public nudity did not reflect a presumed interest in the suppres-
sion of free expression. 89 While public nudists "may be expressing
something about themselves," the plurality noted that it had never
accepted such an expansive notion of expressive conduct, and that a
little expression accompanying a lot of conduct did not necessarily
receive sweeping First Amendment protection.' 9
More importantly, the plurality also rejected the contention that
the statute's application to nude dancing represented the state's at-
tempt to proscribe public nudity merely because it could convey an
erotic message."' Other Indiana erotic dancers could adequately
convey their messages despite wearing pasties and G-strings. 9 2.
Thus, the plurality concluded that the statute did not suppress the
188. Justice Souter agreed that the type of nude dancing at issue in Barnes, while a
"voluntary assumption of ... [a] condition," was, nonetheless, still "subject to a degree of First
Amendment protection." Id. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). However, Jus-
tice Souter believed that Indiana's substantial governmental interests in prohibiting nude danc-
ing resided not in its protection of public morality, but rather in "combating the secondary
effects of adult entertainment." Id. at 2468-69. The Court had originally developed the "sec-
ondary effects" doctrine in Young v. American Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and
Renton v. Playtime Theatres Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), where it held that the governmental
interest in fighting such crime as prostitution was substantial enough for Detroit, Michigan,
and Renton, Washington, to treat adult entertainment establishments differently for zoning
purposes than they treated establishments offering general entertainment. Justice Souter be-
lieved that the type of entertainment offered by the Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theatre was
similar to that at issue in Renton and American Mini Theatres and that Indiana, therefore,
"could reasonably conclude that forbidding nude entertainment . . . furthers its interest in
preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and associated crimes." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2470
(Souter, J., concurring).
189. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462 (plurality opinion).
190. Id. (emphasis added). In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court
stated that "[wie cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea." d. at 376.
The plurality also cited Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), for the following
observation:
It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes-for example, walking down the street or meeting one's friends at a
shopping mall-but such a~kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within
the protection of the First Amendment. We think the activity of these dance-hall
patrons-coming together to engage in recreational dancing-is not protected by
the First Amendment.
Id. at 25.
191. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463 (plurality opinion).
192. Id.
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communication of erotic messages, but only made such messages less
intense and graphic.193 It did not punish "expression," as Indiana
citizens were still free to dance, communicate erotically, and even
communicate erotically while dancing. 94 Instead, the public inde-
cency statute simply prohibited the conduct of public dancing in the
nude.195
Finally, the plurality found O'Brien's "no greater than essen-
tial" prong to be satisfied as the statute was "narrowly tailored" to
reflect Indiana's moral disapproval of public nudity among stran-
gers. 96 Its requirement that dancers "wear at least pasties and G-
string ... [was, therefore,] modest, and the bare minimum necessary
to achieve the state's purpose. "197
Justice White, writing a dissent in which Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined, noted that the plurality had insuffi-
ciently inquired as to the real purposes underlying Indiana's applica-
tion of its public indecency statute to nude dancing.198 Unlike the
all-encompassing prohibition against draft card mutilation at issue in
O'Brien, the Indiana statute did not prohibit all nudity, in general,
or all public nudity, in particular. 99 It did not seek to prohibit pri-
vate nudity and was never applied to nudity in theatrical perform-
ances.200 The application of the statute, therefore, undoubtedly dis-
tinguished between the protected expressive conduct of theatrical
nudity and the protected expressive conduct of nude dancing.2"1 For
Justice White, O'Brien should have placed a heavy burden upon In-
diana to justify its tidy distinction, and demonstrate that it did not
prohibit completely nude dancing because it can communicate erotic
messages more powerfully than semi-nude dancing.2"2 The State
should not have received the benefit of the Court surmising any






198. Id. at 2472-73 (White, J., dissenting).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2473.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.; cf John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categoriza-
tion and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1504 (1975)
(stating the belief that O'Brien Court merely posited the plausible congressional purposes in
prohibiting draft card burning).
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III. ANALYSIS
The above discussion demonstrates that the Court has implicitly
employed a bifurcated O'Brien approach to expressive conduct cases.
It has followed its Thornhill notion that "freedom of speech . . .
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all
matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subse-
quent punishment," '' and has strongly asserted that the highest
level of constitutional protection would attach even to the most com-
munity-offending activities, such as flag-burning, when employed to
convey recognizably political ideas.2" 5 Speech involving the "unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and so-
cial changes" receives the most rigorous constitutional protection,"'
and cannot be suppressed "simply because society finds the [ex-
pressed] idea itself offensive or disagreeable. '2 0 7
Conversely, the Clark Court found "expressive sleeping" to be
insufficiently important to American political life to warrant rigorous
First Amendment protection. 0 8 Such a private activity could, there-
fore, be constitutionally subject to the Park Service's camping prohi-
bition.20 9 Similarly, the Barnes plurality determined that nude danc-
ing involved only marginally important free expression210 and was
entitled to minimal constitutional protection."'
204. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940) (emphasis added).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 122-59.
206. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1956).
207. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
208. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8 (1984).
209. Id. at 299.
210. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted: nude dancing is "expressive conduct within the
outer perimeters of the First Amendment, . . . though . . . only marginally so." Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2458, 2460 (1991).
211. None of the post-O'Brien expressive conduct cases under discussion explicitly em-
ployed the "public concern" test. In fact, the Court has actually only employed this doctrine in
two cases, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). On both occasions, speech not involving a "matter of
public concern" (an internal staff questionnaire and a credit report) was found to be com-
pletely devoid of First Amendment protection. See supra note 78.
If the Court rigidly followed its Connick and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. rationale in Clark
and in Barnes, it would have had to declare "expressive sleeping" and nude dancing to be
non-public matters that did not implicate the First Amendment. Under this scenario, an
O'Brien analysis would have been inapplicable since it is relevant only to expressive conduct
that is protected by the First Amendment. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
However, while finding that an internal staff questionnaire was unprotected "private"
speech, the Connick Court nonetheless noted that speech "not touching upon a matter of public
concern" could still receive constitutional protection as the First Amendment "does not protect
speech and assembly only to the extent that it can be characterized as political." Connick, 461
U.S. at 147 (quoting Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 233 (1967)). Such
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However, the underlying spirit of the Barnes plurality decision
is much more sweeping than Clark. Whereas the Clark Court actu-
ally applied O'Brien through its "time, place, or manner" equivalent
to the politically unimportant "expressive sleeping" proposed by the
Community for Creative Non-Violence," 2 the Barnes plurality em-
ployed a tidy syllogism that rendered O'Brien a mere formality and
readily ignored the possible multiple interests being served by Indi-
ana's nude dancing prohibition.2"' For the Barnes plurality, since
nude dancing was an unimportant, "private" matter, Indiana's pro-
hibition of "people appearing in the nude among strangers in public
places" could be hypothesized"" as advancing Indiana's substantial
state interest in safeguarding public morality.21 Once the Barnes
plurality had convinced itself that Indiana had satisfied this govern-
mental interest component of O'Brien, it could readily find O'Brien's
"unrelatedness" prong to be satisfied by deciding that nudists, in
general, were not necessarily "expressing something about them-
selves," 2 6 and that the act of nude dancing, in particular, was not
necessary to convey an erotic message.2" Thus, Indiana's nude danc-
ing prohibition satisfied O'Brien by advancing a substantial govern-
mental interest in public morality and being unrelated to an interest
in the suppression of free expression simply because the Barnes plu-
rality decided that nude dancing possessed limited expressive value.
Despite its directly springing from an implicit application of the
"public concern" doctrine, the circular logic employed by the Barnes
plurality is also partially traceable to O'Brien, and the Clark
Court's subsequent equation of the O'Brien test with the "time,
place, or manner" standard.21 8 Recall that the Court will constitu-
tionally validate an incidental restriction on constitutionally protected
"private" speech, therefore, does not necessarily "fall[] into one of the narrow and well-defined
classes of expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that the State can
prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction." Id. But, it nonetheless
lacks the sweeping First Amendment protection of "public" speech. "Expressive sleeping" and
nude dancing, therefore, can be deemed to occupy this constitutional middle ground as expres-
sive activities on private matters that are worthy of limited First Amendment protection. See
also supra note 80.
212. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
214. Indiana did not record its legislative history and the Indiana Supreme Court had
"not shed additional light on the [public indecency] statute's purpose." Barnes, I1I S. Ct. at
2461 (1991) (plurality opinion).
215. Id.; see supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
216. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462 (plurality opinion).
217. Id. at 2463.
218. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984).
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expressive conduct:
[I]f it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.2"9
A. Substantial Governmental Interests
The O'Brien Court found the "substantial governmental inter-
est" prong satisfied by such administrative conveniences as initial
draftee notification, the need to provide registrants with proof of re-
gistration, the desire to facilitate communication between registrants
and local induction boards, and the goal of reminding registrants of
their duty to notify induction boards of address and status
changes.22 Administrative convenience is certainly a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest as governmental entities should act efficiently and
should strive to maximize their use of public tax dollars. And, such
"conveniences" as draftee notification probably did facilitate the
smooth functioning of the Selective Service.
However, it is difficult to imagine that the mere pursuit of effi-
ciency can be substantial enough to restrict the fundamental right of
free expression. The First Amendment is absolutely unconcerned
with governmental efficiency. It does not qualify its broad grants of
the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of as-
sembly with a proviso that such rights be exercised so as not to cause
governmental waste. The O'Brien Court, therefore, defined "sub-
stantial governmental interest" at an exceedingly broad level,
wherein the legitimate congressional pursuit of administrative conve-
nience was substantial enough to suppress David Paul O'Brien's
constitutionally protected expressive conduct of draft card burning.2"
The practical meaning of "substantial," then, is not "impor-
tant," as O'Brien's focus on an "important or substantial govern-
mental interest" would seem to equate the two terms. Rather, a
"substantial governmental interest" is merely one that is "not imagi-
nary," 2  and will satisfy O'Brien to the extent that it does not re-
219. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
220. Id. at 377-80.
221. See supra notes 91-95; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions,
54 U. Cm. L. REV. 46, 51 (1987).
222. Alfange, supra note 96, at 23.
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present some "wholly useless" legislative pronouncement."' This
also provides the Court with an opening merely to hypothesize legis-
lative intent and surmise the "substantial governmental interest" be-
ing served by an incidental restriction on "expressive conduct."
Under this formulation, a governmental entity does not sustain
any real burden of demonstrating the depth of its substantial interest.
The Court will readily accept any plausible explanation, thereby
rendering its inquiry to the functional equivalent of mere rationality
review. Thus, if administrative convenience can be deemed a "sub-
stantial governmental interest," then so could the Park Service's de-
sire to maintain "the parks in the heart of our capital in an attrac-
tive and intact condition,"22 '  and so could Indiana's moral
disapproval of public nudity.225 Since legislatures "simply do not en-
act wholly useless provisions, ' 226 virtually any restriction can plausi-
bly be imagined to serve a governmental interest. This, in turn, ren-
ders O'Brien's "substantiality" requirement functionally trivial.227
B. Governmental Interests Must Be Unrelated to the Suppression
of Free Expression
The O'Brien standard also requires that the government inter-
est served by an incidental restriction on expressive conduct be "un-
related to the suppression of free expression. "228 In theory, this
seems rather speech-protective: Governmental entities simply cannot
intend to prohibit their citizens from employing "expressive con-
duct." However, in practice, legislatures will rarely, if ever, explic-
itly state that they targeted free speech because they simply did not
like "what the defendant was saying. '229 Instead, "reference will
generally be made to some danger beyond the message, such as a
danger of riot, unlawful action or violent overthrow of the govern-
223. Ely, supra note 203, at 1486.
224. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984).
225. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (plurality opinion).
The Barnes plurality's consideration of the protection of public morality as a "substantial
governmental interest" is unprecedented in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. In
fact, earlier cases such as Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971), had strongly asserted
that the immorality or basic offensiveness of speech is insufficient, without more, to justify
restrictions on constitutionally protected speech. See The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Leading
Cases, 105 HARv. L. REV. 177, 293 (1991).
226. Ely, supra note 203, at 1486.
227. Id. at 1485-86.
228. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
229. Ely, supra note 203, at 1497.
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.ment." '3 We can easily add to that list "maintaining the parks in
the heart of our capital in an attractive and intact condition,"231
moral disapproval of "people appearing in the nude among strangers
in public places," '32 and a host of other supposed purposes masking
possible legislative intents to suppress free expression. The State of
Texas made a riot reference in Johnson, which the Court's rigorous
scrutiny found to be mere subterfuge for its desire to prohibit flag-
burning because of the message that it communicated. 33
The entire issue of legislative purpose is, in itself, particularly
troublesome. The O'Brien Court asserted, in no uncertain terms,
that its attempt to discern the "substantial governmental interest"
served by the congressional protection of a draft card's physical in-
tegrity did not amount to an assessment of legislative motives.24
Members of Congress might have had various motives in articulating
their support for the provision, thereby rendering judicial psychoa-
nalysis rather problematical and constitutionally dubious.23 Besides,
even the printed legislative history materials can be easily manipu-
lated and prepared specifically to withstand some future course of
judicial review. 3 6 This would then force the Court to play continual
"catch-up" with legislatures that are bent upon undermining the
Court's constitutional function through unadulterated subterfuge.
For example, the Court will announce a searching scrutiny of legis-
lative motives, and in response the lawmakers will concoct methods
to thwart the Court's inquiry. The Court will then promulgate new
standards, followed by new legislative subterfuge, and so on. Mean-
ingful judicial review under a motivational inquiry rationale would
therefore be rendered practically impossible. In addition, such legis-
lative history can, nonetheless, display honest concerns with non-
speech related problems, while simultaneously exhibiting specific
desires to suppress unpopular expression.23 7 The Court would then
face the extremely unwelcome task of determining whether the hon-
est concerns were sincere, and whether they actually triumphed over
the desires to suppress dissent. This would also be an impossible
230. Id. at 1496.
231. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984).
232. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991) (plurality opinion).
233. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 391, 408 (1989).
234. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968); see also supra note 89 and
accompanying text.
235. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383-84; see also Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction
in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113, 132 (1981).





C. Incidental Restrictions Must Be No Greater than Essential in
Furtherance of Substantial Governmental Interests
Finally, the O'Brien standard requires an incidental restriction
upon expressive conduct to be "no greater than is essential" to the
furtherance of a "substantial governmental interest."2 9 Since the
Clark Court equated O'Brien with the "time, place, or manner"
standard,240 this "no greater than essential" prong actually now
means that the incidental restriction must be: (1) "narrowly tai-
lored" and (2) leave open "ample alternative channels" for free ex-
pression.241 This does not mean that governmental entities are re-
quired to act in the least speech-restrictive manner or even the
second or third least restrictive manners.242 Instead, an incidental re-
striction upon expressive conduct will satisfy this aspect of O'Brien
merely upon a demonstration that the restriction "promotes a sub-
stantial governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation" and that the remaining "alternative channels"
of communication are not wholly inadequate.24 3
238. In Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 391 (1989), and United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310 (1990), the Court avoided the legislative motive problem by finding that the anti-
desecration statutes facially advanced governmental interests in the suppression of free expres-
sion. The Texas statute punished flag desecration that would "seriously offend one or more
persons likely to observe or discover [the] action." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (West
1989) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993) (delet-
ing application to "a state or national flag")). Thus, it was directed only at communicative
actions, generally, and subjectively offensive ones, in particular.Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409, 411.
The Flag Protection Act of 1990 punished the knowing mutilation, burning, and defiling of an
American flag but permitted such activities if associated with the traditional disposal of a warn
or soiled flag. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Thus, the Act specifically targeted
the use of an American flag to convey a message, and words such as "mutilation" referred to
the disrespectful treatment of an American flag in order to damage the flag's symbolic value.
Eichman, 496 U.S. at 317.
While Johnson and Eichman suggest an escape from the legislative motive puzzle, the
anti-desecration statutes could rather easily be read to represent interests in the suppression of
free expression. This will not always be the case. The Park Service in Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), probably promulgated its camping regulations
without considering the possibility that anti-homelessness activists might want to stage an over-
night event in Lafayette Park and the Mall. Similarly, the Indiana statute at issue in Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991), does not display a facial interest in expression of
any type. See supra note 174.
239. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
240. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
241. Id. at 293.
242. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989); see also supra note 166
and accompanying text.
243. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 799.
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Again, in theory, O'Brien appears to provide a decent level of
constitutional protection to "expressive conduct." The "no greater
than essential" prong apparently prohibits governmental entities
from imposing unnecessarily harsh burdens upon constitutionally
protected "expressive conduct. '" ' This seems rather reasonable,
even quite laudable. However, the "time, place, and manner" focus
upon whether an incidental restriction "promotes a substantial gov-
ernmental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation,'"245 actually creates an "efficiency" rationale that renders
this aspect of O'Brien a highly deferential test. Almost any regula-
tion can be imagined to increase the possibility that a governmental
interest will be achieved. Legislatures "simply do not enact wholly
useless provisions. '216 And, imposing a requirement that a govern-
mental entity demonstrate that a very direct connection exists be-
tween the incidental restriction of expressive conduct and the
achievement of a substantial governmental interest would create a
type of strict scrutiny utterly inconsistent with O'Brien's hybridized
speech/conduct orientation.
24 7
The "no greater than essential" formulation would therefore
"reach only laws that engage in the gratuitous inhibition of expres-
sion. "248 Only incidental restrictions on expressive conduct that have
244. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
245. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (emphasis added).
246. Ely, supra note 203, at 1486.
247. Id. at 1485.
248. Id. (emphasis added). The O'Brien Court found that the Selective Service Act
amendment prohibited only the "noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct" (i.e. the act
of burning a draft card) and therefore was narrowly tailored to facilitate the smooth and effi-
cient function of the Service. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381-82. Similarly, the Clark Court found
that the Park Service regulations "narrowly focuse[d] on the Government's substantial interest
in maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capital in an attractive and intact condition,
readily available to the millions of people who wish to see and enjoy them by their presence."
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984). The regulations
therefore prohibited only the "noncommunicative aspect" of the CCNV's conduct (i.e. over-
night sleeping). Id. And, finally, the Barnes Court found Indiana's "public indecency" statute
to be "narrowly tailored" since the G-strings and pasties requirement was "modest and the
bare minimum necessary to achieve the state's [public decency] purpose." Barnes v. Glen The-
atre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991). The statute therefore only prohibited the "noncom-
municative aspect" of erotic dancing (i.e. dancing while completely nude). Id.
It is highly debatable whether draft card burning, overnight sleeping, and completely
nude dancing are noncommunicative in the context of the activities undertaken in O'Brien,
Clark, and Barnes. The Court simply accepted them as noncommunicative, thereby indicating
that "narrowly tailored" is a highly deferential requirement. We do not, however, know the
exact limits of the Court's deference in this area as the Court failed, in both Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 391 (1989), and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), to reach O'Brien's
"no greater than essential" prong, since the anti-desecration statutes were both deemed related
to governmental interests in the suppression of free expression. See supra note 238.
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absolutely no effect upon the achievement of a substantial govern-
mental interest would be constitutionally impermissible. A standard
that would invalidate only the gratuitous restriction of expressive
conduct can hardly offer any real constitutional protection.
Finally, the Court's "time, place, or manner" requirement that
the incidental restriction of expressive conduct leave open "ample al-
ternative channels" for free expression 49 is also a highly deferential
standard. Here, "ample" actually means "plausible" or "adequate,"
at least to the extent that governmental entities are not required to
leave open the best, or most efficacious alternative channels of com-
munication.26 The O'Brien Court itself did not actually inquire
whether David Paul O'Brien had an "ample alternative channel" to
express his opposition to the Vietnam War and the military draft.2"
Presumably, he could have stood in front of the South Boston Court-
house, waving his draft card, yelling obscenities at the Johnson Ad-
ministration and exhorting others to join his cause. Under such cir-
cumstances, O'Brien could not have been prosecuted under the
Selective Service Act since his activities would not have amounted to
the knowing destruction or mutilation of his draft card.252 While the
"illegal" act of burning his draft card might have been the most dra-
matic and effective form of political protest, the "incidental restric-
tion" doctrine does not necessarily guarantee the best or most effec-
tive channel of communication.25 It only provides for a plausible
one.
Similarly, an anti-homelessness demonstration might be most
effectively undertaken by groups of people camping overnight in
Washington D.C.'s national parks. The homeless often sleep in ur-
ban parks and "expressive sleeping" might be the most powerful
method to dramatize their plight. However, the Clark Court did not
concern itself with such subtleties as it found that the terms of the
Park Service permit still allowed the Community for Creative Non-
Violence (CCNV) to employ symbolic signs, construct "tent cities"
and communicate with the media and general public.25 4 And, while
completely nude dancing might create the most intense emotional ef-
fect of erotic dancing, the Barnes plurality found that Indiana's G-
strings and pasties requirement still afforded Indiana's citizens the
249. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
250. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
253. Ward, 491 U.S. at 802.
254. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
opportunity to engage in and witness erotic dancing.2 55 Therefore, in
the Court's estimation, a regulation engendering a mere modest ef-
fect on the effectiveness of a particular mode of expressive conduct is
the functional equivalent of its having no discernible impact upon
the effectiveness of the communication. 50
The practical effect of the "ample alternative channels" stan-
dard is to impair the speech of those individuals employing non-
traditional expression in their opposition to prevailing public opinion
or social mores.2 57 David Paul O'Brien would not have burned his
draft card in support of President Johnson's foreign policy. CCNV
would not have sought an overnight sleeping permit if it had thought
that American society was sensitive to the plight of the homeless.
And, dancers at the Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theatre would not
have desired to dance completely nude if their customers subscribed
to mainstream notions of sexuality. The Court itself has said, on a
number of occasions, that "a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment ... is that the government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable."2 8 However, the highly deferential "ample alterna-
tive channels" standard actually allows governmental entities to sup-
press constitutionally protected expressive conduct precisely because
society finds the expressed ideas offensive or disagreeable.
D. O'Brien's Actual Accomplishment
The above discussion demonstrates that the O'Brien test in con-
junction with the "time, place, or manner" standard cannot, in itself,
invalidate an incidental restriction on "expressive conduct." It would
find a "substantial governmental interest" in all but the most utterly
255. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (1991) (plurality opinion).
Again, the Court did not reach the question of ample alternative channels of communication in
either Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 391 (1989), or United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990), as it found the anti-desecration statutes to be related to governmental interests in the
suppression of free expression. See supra notes 238 and accompanying text.
256. One commentator suggests that the Court is saying that "[a] modest effect, in other
words, is not no effect." Stone, supra note 221, at 79. This assumes that the Court employs a
kind of continuum to arrive at a point where a mere modest effect on free expression becomes
a significant effect. However, the Court is not attempting to discern the actual degree to which
an incidental restriction suppresses free expression. Rather, the Court only requires that the
restriction leaves open "ample alternative channels" for free expression. "Ample," as we have
seen, is a rather flexible term and can encompass almost anything short of inadequate.
257. Id. at 83.




useless legislative pronouncements.259 It would probably find an inci-
dental restriction on expressive conduct to be "no greater than is es-
sential" in all but the most gratuitous legislative enactments. 260 In
addition, it would find an alternative communicative channel to be
"ample" as long as it was "feasible" and not wholly inadequate.2 61
O'Brien's only real significance then is supplied by its "unrelated-
ness" prong. However, an incidental restriction that is related to an
interest in the suppression of free expression simply represents a
"content restriction" that would then be subjected to the Court's sep-
arate strict scrutiny test.262 This would completely remove the Court
from O'Brien's orbit. The Johnson and Eichman Courts found the
anti-desecration statutes to violate O'Brien's "unrelatedness" prong
because the highly politicized nature of flag-burning allowed the
Court to find a facial content restriction directly aimed at punishing
the disrespectful treatment of the American flag for political pur-
poses.263 However, the Court could not find facial content restric-
tions when confronted with incidental restrictions on such private,
politically unimportant expressive conduct as an anti-homelessness
demonstration"" and nude dancing.26 5 Since it is so difficult to dis-
cern legislative purpose when it is not expressed on the face of a
statute,266 it is highly unlikely that incidental restrictions on such
politically unimportant expressive conduct will ever violate O'Brien's
"unrelatedness" prong. The Court simply cannot make the type of
inquiry that would find that such facially neutral statutes repre-
sented an interest in the suppression of free expression.267 An even
more troubling aspect with the Court's current bifurcated O'Brien
approach is that if the Court can consider something as blatantly
political as an anti-homelessness demonstration to be a politically
unimportant, non-public matter, then it will undoubtedly view most
forms of expressive conduct to be similarly irrelevant. Given the
Court's current conservative majority, most future expressive conduct
cases will undoubtedly receive very cursory Clark/Barnes review.
The O'Brien test, in its current bifurcated mode and subsumed
within the "time, place, and manner" standard, therefore, provides a
259. See supra notes 220-27 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 239-48 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 249-58 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 122-59 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 160-73 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 228-38 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 228-38 and accompanying text.
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practically meaningless level of judicial review.
IV. PROPOSAL
In an effort to provide effective constitutional protection to all
forms of expressive conduct that the Court assumes to be included
under the First Amendment's umbrella, the Court should do the fol-
lowing: Abandon its implicit distinction between (supposedly) politi-
cally important speech; and (supposedly) politically less important
speech; and adopt a unified "compelling interest" standard that
would (1) require a "close fit" between an incidental restriction and
the compelling governmental interest, and (2) leave open equivalent,
feasible, alternative channels of communication.
First, the Court should discontinue assigning disparate constitu-
tional protection to various forms of speech based upon their appar-
ent importance to the American political process.26 It is certainly
true that speech which criticizes governmental policies or seeks to
affect fundamental social and political change is of critical demo-
cratic importance and deserves the highest presumption of constitu-
tional protection. However, it does not necessarily follow that speech
apparently lacking such lofty intentions is relatively worthless and
thus deserving of less constitutional protection.
In fact, the Court's own ideas as to the kinds of speech that
implicate "matters of public concern" have changed over time. Labor
picketing, considered by the Court to be indispensably important to
the process of popular democracy in 1940,269 became mere economic
activity by 1980.270 Whether this denigration can be attributed to the
decline of the American labor movement is completely irrelevant. In-
stead, the relevant factor is that the "public concern" doctrine,
whether it is applied explicitly or implicitly, allows the whims of five
Supreme Court Justices to determine the bounds of legitimate politi-
cal debate. The irony of this approach should be apparent: An
unelected judiciary decides which issues are indispensable to demo-
cratic self-government.271
268. My ideas relating to the Court's implicit application of the "public concern" doc-
trine to expressive conduct cases is heavily influenced by the work of Professor Cynthia L.
Estlund. See generally Estlund, supra note 45.
269. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940).
270. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67; Estlund, supra note 45, at 22-23; see
also discussion supra note 73.
271. See Estlund, supra note 45, at 21-22. The Court itself has even recognized this
problem when it declared that "[to allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for
public debate would be to allow that government control over the search for political truth."
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980).
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The Court's historical distinction between supposedly "public"
political speech and supposedly "private" apolitical speech has an-
other level of intellectual speciousness since nearly all "private"
speech has public implications.2 72 The opinions of nude dancing pa-
trons regarding the politically charged issues of sexual harassmerit,
sexual discrimination, and sexual assault may very well be influ-
enced by their responses to such entertainment. If something like
nude dancing can contribute to the political opinions of its viewers,
then, even according to the Court's own methodology, such expres-
sive conduct deserves the highest constitutional respect. Besides, pri-
vate concerns are often intensely political as parts of the Republican
Party attempted to turn the 1992 election into a referendum on the
"right to privacy" as it related to abortion and homosexual rights.2 73
While "nude dancing" is clearly not the equivalent of the editorial
page of the New York Times, it is also not completely irrelevant to
the lives of certain individuals as they attempt to deal with their
world. Five Supreme Court Justices, or four in the case of Barnes,
should not have the audacity to declare it to be on the marginal
"outer perimeters" of the First Amendment.
Second, the Court should require that incidental restrictions of
expressive conduct serve compelling (i.e. truly vital) governmental
interests.27 4 While this is the normal strict scrutiny threshold issue
for purposeful content restrictions of free speech, 75 the above analy-
sis has shown that virtually any governmental interest can be deemed
at least substantial.27  A compelling interest requirement would,
therefore, immediately invalidate any restriction on constitutionally
protected expressive conduct that advanced merely a "substantial
governmental interest." A governmental entity would have the bur-
den of affirmatively demonstrating the compelling nature. of its
course of action, with some degree of particularity, and the Court
would refuse to hypothesize the possible interests served by a statu-
tory enactment. The Court would also consider the nature of the
governmental interest relative to the fundamental importance that
the First Amendment has in American constitutional jurisprudence.
Under the above standard, such a vague concept as the "protec-
272. Estlund, supra note 45, at 31-32.
273. See William J. Eaton, "Purist" Right: Upward Christian Soldiers, L.A. TIMEs,
Aug. 21, 1992, at A13.
274. See Redish, supra note 235, at 143 (proposing that all restrictions upon constitu-
tionally protected speech should serve compelling governmental interests).
275. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 220-27 and accompanying text.
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tion of the social order and public morality"277 would be insuffi-
ciently compelling, as a preliminary matter, to suppress constitution-
ally protected "expressive conduct." While the protection of public
morality might rise to a compelling level under some circum-
stances, 278 a governmental entity would have the burden of particu-
larly demonstrating how the expressive conduct that it seeks to sup-
press is creating public immorality. If it is unable to do so, the
restriction would automatically violate the First Amendment, and the
Court's inquiry is concluded. The Park Service's camping ban at is-
sue in Clark 279 might fare somewhat better under the compelling
interest standard. Here, the Park Service would need to describe how
"expressive sleeping" would create maintenance problems in Lafay-
ette Park and the Mall and that such problems elevate the ban to a
compelling interest. Conversely, O'Brien's administrative conve-
nience rationale2 11 would never rise to the level of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, as the First Amendment should be seen as being
oblivious to governmental efficiency. Such a governmental interest,
therefore, could never lead to the suppression of constitutionally pro-
tected "expressive conduct." While the compelling interest standard
might seem rather harsh, free speech is, nonetheless, an enumerated,
fundamental constitutional right, and even its incidental restriction
should only be countenanced in the service of the most important
governmental interests.
Third, the Court should require that an incidental restriction on
expressive conduct legitimately advances a compelling governmental
interest. Such a nexus requirement would ensure that the proffered
compelling governmental interest is not feigned and that the inciden-
tal restriction of expressive conduct is a necessary means to achieve
the end sought by the government. Thus, a prohibition of completely
nude dancing would have to be shown to legitimately advance a com-
pelling governmental interest in the protection of public morality
(provided that the protection of public morality is considered to be a
compelling governmental interest). The mere fact that such a ban
might protect public morality would be insufficient as it cannot re-
present a mere gratuitous legislative undertaking. 81 Similarly, the
277. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991) (plurality opinion).
278. But, this would probably relate to public morality in the broader sense, as opposed
to protecting the public from supposed sexual immorality.
279. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 292 (1984).
280. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 380-83 (1968).
281. It is difficult to imagine how public morality is protected by erotic dancers being
outfitted in pasties and G-strings but is damaged when those same dancers perform completely
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Park Service would have to demonstrate that its camping ban would
effectively further its compelling interest in maintaining Lafayette
Park and the Mall in intact conditions. The mere fact that the ban
might achieve such an interest would be insufficient to deny CCNV
its overnight permit. Both the nude dancing and camping bans
would violate the First Amendment if they fail to advance compel-
ling governmental interests in an effective and forthright manner.
Fourth, the Court should ask whether the restriction on expres-
sive conduct leaves open equivalent, truly feasible, alternative chan-
nels of communication.282 This is not really a "least restrictive alter-
native" standard for which the Court has recently chided an
appellate court for inserting into a "time, place, or manner" analy-
sis.28 Rather, it would simply inquire whether the incidental restric-
tion has an inhibiting effect upon the effectiveness of an actor's "ex-
pressive conduct." Unlike the Court's "ample alternative channels"
standard, the feasibility standard would acknowledge that modest ef-
fects can significantly decrease the power of speech. It would, there-
fore, require a governmental entity to offer a further justification for
its incidental restriction of expressive conduct.28 Thus, the Court
would recognize that "expressive sleeping" might be the most effec-
tive method of dramatizing the plight of the homeless and invalidate
the camping ban, even though CCNV could still display symbolic
signs and build tent cities. It would also recognize that nude dancing
might be the most powerful method by which to communicate an
erotic message and invalidate Indiana's prohibition, even though the
dancers might be able to communicate erotically while wearing past-
ies and G-strings. Unlike the Court's "ample alternative channels"
standard, the "feasibility" standard would explicitly consider the de-
gree to Which expressive conduct would be hampered by an inciden-
tal restriction.
Expressed as a test, the above proposal would read: An inciden-
tal restriction on constitutionally protected expressive conduct is valid
if (1) it represents a compelling governmental interest, (2) it legiti-
mately and necessarily advances the compelling governmental inter-
est, and (3) it leaves open equivalent, truly feasible, alternative chan-
nude. The performance is still presumably erotic and will engender the same kind of response
from the viewer, despite its supposedly less graphic effect.
282. Redish, supra note 235, at 143.
283. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
284. See Stone, supra note 221, at 79 (asserting that "even if a modest effect is insuffi-
cient [in itself] to elevate the standard of review ... it is sufficient to require the government to
offer some meaningful explanation for its refusal to accommodate free speech").
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nels of communication.
While the proposed test for incidental restrictions of expressive
conduct is similar to the Court's strict scrutiny approach to pur-
poseful, content-based restrictions of free speech,285 there is no real
reason why the Court must continually adhere to its content-based/
content-neutral distinction.286 No matter what its outward form,
speech suffers the same fate whether it is suppressed by an inciden-
tal, content-neutral restriction or by a purposeful, content-based re-
striction. By merely focusing upon the intent of governmental enti-
ties, the Court has historically diminished the needs of the other
important parties in the free expression equation-the speaker and
the audience.287 Given that the First Amendment explicitly restricts
governmental activity, the needs of the speaker and the audience
should prevail over the supposed governmental need not to be bur-
dened by an unexpected restriction on free expression.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed "compelling interest" standard would provide
real constitutional protection to the fundamental right of free speech
when it takes the form of "expressive conduct." It would automati-
cally invalidate mere gratuitous, or otherwise not truly important,
inhibitions. And it would require that incidental restrictions be nec-
essary to the achievement of compelling governmental interests,
while leaving open equivalent, feasible alternative communicative
channels. It would, therefore, implicitly recognize that dissent, in the
broadest terms, is often expressed by non-traditional activity and
would very explicitly provide such activity with a high level of con-
stitutional protection. It would also avoid judicial inquiry into legis-
lative purpose and/or motivation by completely abandoning
O'Brien's "unrelatedness" prong.
While the "unrelatedness" inquiry provides O'Brien with its
only theoretically real level of heightened judicial scrutiny, it also
can involve such difficult psychological determinations that the Court
will most likely only locate those rare facially-expressed interests in
the suppression of free expression.288 Such a finding triggers strict
scrutiny, anyway.289 Thus, the proposed "compelling interest" stan-
285. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
286. Redish, supra note 235, at 144.
287. See Williams, supra note 103, at 658.
288. See supra notes 228-38 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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dard would avoid the preliminary O'Brien inquiry while providing a
proper respect for First Amendment values.
Jeffrey S. Raskin

